A Price-Based Royalty Tax? by Clausing, Kimberly A. & Durst, Michael C.
Working Paper 41
www.ictd.ac
A Price-Based Royalty Tax?  
 
Kimberly A. Clausing and Michael C. Durst
October 2015
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ICTD Working Paper 41 
 
 
 
 
 
A Price-Based Royalty Tax?  
 
 
 
 
Kimberly A. Clausing and Michael C. Durst 
 
 
October 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
A Price-Based Royalty Tax?  
Kimberly A. Clausing and Michael C. Durst 
ICTD Working Paper 41 
First published by the Institute of Development Studies in October 2015 
© Kimberley Clausing and Michael C. Durst 2015 
ISBN: 978 1 78118 275 8 
  
The authors of this paper grants to the IDS and the ICTD a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive 
licence, or sublicence, to reproduce, communicate to the public, use, adapt, publish, distribute, display and transmit the work in 
any and all media, and to sublicense others (including the Crown) to reproduce, communicate to the public, use, adapt, publish, 
distribute, display and transmit the work in any and all media, for non-commercial purposes and with appropriate credit being 
given to the author and ICTD funders. 
 
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. 
 
This work has been licensed by the copyright holder for distribution in electronic format via any medium for the lifetime of the 
OpenDocs repository for the purpose of free access without charge and can be found at http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/ 
 
Also available from: 
International Centre for Tax and Development,  
Institute of Development Studies, 
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK   
Tel: +44 (0) 1273 606261 Fax: +44 (0) 1273 621202  
E-mail: info@ictd.ac   
Web: www.ictd.ac 
 
 
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 877338) 
  
 3 
A Price-Based Royalty Tax?  
 
Kimberly A. Clausing and Michael C. Durst 
 
 
Summary  
 
This paper considers the merits of a price-based royalty, a royalty for which the rate varies 
with the product price, as a fiscal instrument for taxing extractive industries. In light of the 
literature on natural resources taxation, the case for a price-based royalty is appealing. A 
price-based royalty captures some of the desirable attributes of an income or resource rent 
tax, but in comparison to such taxes, it is easier to administer since revenue is much less 
sensitive to transfer price manipulation and tax avoidance efforts. In order to explore how a 
price-based royalty might provide some of the advantages of income- or rent-based taxation, 
the paper analyses the relationship between product prices and firm profits, using a dataset 
of the world’s largest extractive firms from the Forbes Global 2000 list during the period 
2003-2014. This analysis indicates that, for both oil/gas and mining firms, there is a nearly 
one-to-one relationship between product prices and firm profitability; prices 1 per cent higher 
tend to be associated with profits about 0.76 per cent higher for oil/gas firms and about 1.38 
per cent higher for mining firms. The paper concludes by recommending that tax 
policymakers give serious consideration to increasing the use of price-based royalties. 
 
Keywords: transfer pricing; extractive industries; natural resource taxation; royalties; 
resource rent tax. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper considers the merits of a price-based royalty as a tax instrument for extractive 
industries. Section 1 reviews the literature in this area, arguing that a price-based royalty has 
appealing features, given the experience with taxation in the natural resources sector. 
Section 2 analyses the relationship between firm profitability and underlying product prices, 
using a dataset that focuses on large extractive firms in the oil, gas, and mining sectors over 
the period 2003-2014. A final section concludes and discusses policy recommendations. 
 
 
1  Literature review 
 
This literature review is organised in three parts. First, the review addresses tax policy 
objectives in the natural resources sector, and, in particular, the competing concerns of 
government revenue and investor incentives. Second, it discusses the merits of typical tax 
policy choices in the natural resource sector. Finally, the review considers the idea of a price-
based royalty, and surveys the limited experience with such fiscal instruments in practice. 
 
1.1 Tax policy objectives 
 
This section focuses on tax policy goals in the natural resource sector. The natural resource 
sector is an important source of tax revenue for many less developed countries, but there are 
also important trade-offs between revenue aims and the goal of attracting investment. 
 
There is no doubt that natural resource industries are a key part of many less developed 
countries’ economies, accounting for a large share of GDP and generating important impacts 
on economic activity and government revenue. Yet the literature shows that resource wealth 
is not always associated with economic growth or poverty alleviation, and there are important 
concerns about the capacity of less developed countries to collect appropriate levels of tax 
revenue from this sector.1 
 
As one example, the Africa Progress Panel notes:  
 
Resource-rich countries in Africa are highly vulnerable to aggressive tax planning and 
tax evasion facilitated by the extensive use of offshore companies, the high levels of 
intra-company trade and the commercial secrecy surrounding foreign investment 
activity. African governments lack the human, financial and technical resources 
needed to secure tax compliance, and the commercial market intelligence needed to 
assess company tax liabilities. As a result they are losing significant revenue streams. 
(Africa Progress Panel 2013: 65) 
 
Yet natural resource industries have the potential to make large contributions to both the 
economy and government revenue in a significant number of countries. IMF (2012) notes 
that there are over twenty countries where petroleum revenue exceeds 10 per cent of GDP, 
and that mining revenue is also an important, and growing, share of GDP in many countries, 
as shown in Boadway and Keen (2010).2 Yet, as documented in Laporte and Rota-Graziosi 
(2014: 12-13), mining exports have increased a great deal in recent years, while revenue 
from the mining sector has not always increased proportionately; ‘mining tax revenue 
represented around 12% of the value of exports in 1995 and less than 10% in 2010’.  
                                                 
1  See African Progress Panel (2013); Humphreys et al. (2007); Smith (2012).  
2  See Table 1 in Boadway and Keen (2010). For example, copper accounts for 12% of government revenue in Chile, and 
iron ore and gold account for 8% of government revenue in Liberia.  
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While ensuring appropriate tax revenue is important, there are also balancing considerations, 
such as enabling other aspects of country tax systems to be healthy.3 There is also an 
inevitable trade-off between tax revenue goals and ensuring that the tax system does not 
provide an undue deterrent to investors. While good tax system design may mitigate the 
severity of this trade-off, it is still a fundamental tax policy problem. 
 
Indeed, there are many factors to balance in the design of better tax systems for extractive 
industries. Natural resource industries present special tax design policy considerations due 
to their characteristics, including: (a) high sunk costs of exploration and early stages of 
production; (b) long production periods followed by eventual resource depletion or 
exhaustion; (c) risk and uncertainty due to variable success in exploration and initial 
production as well as volatility in both input and output prices; (d) asymmetric information 
between the government and the investor, where the latter party has greater knowledge 
about the investment prospects; (e) the presence of economic rents due to profits above 
those that would cover normal economic costs, as well as the likely market power of the 
investing firms; and (f) the key importance of this sector for meeting the revenue needs of 
many less developed countries that are abundant in natural resources, a factor which gives 
natural resource firms substantial political leverage. Boadway and Keen (2010) provide a 
thorough discussion of these features.  
 
These factors shed light on the inevitable trade-off between investor incentives and 
government revenue. Consider first the large up-front costs of natural resource products, 
combined with their underlying risk and uncertainty. As Daniel et al. (2008) emphasise, 
investor incentives in natural resource projects will depend on the details of the tax system 
that determine effective tax rates. Given the role of risk, uncertainty, and economic rents, a 
tax on profits or resource rents may be particularly appealing, as discussed in Baunsgaard 
(2001). Such taxes make the government a partner in the project, thus absorbing some of 
the investor risk; tax revenue is then procyclical, increasing with the underlying profitability of 
the investor as well as product prices. Indeed, many economists are attracted by the 
efficiency properties of a resource rent tax that would only tax projects once initial costs had 
been overcome.  
 
Yet here, as elsewhere, practical difficulties may get in the way. For instance, the 
administration of a resource rent tax is complex, and complexity may provide ample 
opportunities for tax avoidance, particularly in countries that are lacking in tax administration 
capacity. More generally, as noted by Laporte and de Quatrebarbes (2015), very little is 
known about the sharing of rent between less developed country governments and investors 
due to conceptual difficulties, poor data, and constantly evolving circumstances. 
 
Further, governments also face risk: revenue streams that are stable and predictable are 
desirable. For this reason, taxes that are based on output (either royalties or production 
sharing agreements) are potentially attractive, since they are likely both easier to administer 
and less subject to tax avoidance. Yet, these revenue sources are also likely to be variable. 
Ahmad and Mottu (2002) emphasise the importance of revenue volatility for oil-producing 
developing countries, and Baunsgaard (2001) also emphasises the highly variable product 
prices in this sector.  
 
One important issue that is essential to tax system design is whether tax policies should be 
progressive. In this literature, the term progressive is used to indicate taxes that 
automatically increase (as a share of the tax base) when profits, or product prices, are 
                                                 
3  Observers worry that countries can become too reliant on natural resource taxation: since the supply of natural 
resources is finite, the natural resource sector may be particularly volatile, and excessive reliance on natural resource 
revenue may undermine tax capacity, as considered by Crivelli and Gupta (2014). 
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higher.4 Several arguments speak in favour of progressive taxes on natural resource 
industries. As Laporte and Rota-Graziosi (2014) discuss, this may help governments earn 
more revenue without deterring investment, since revenue would rise automatically with the 
underlying project profitability, but taxes would be automatically less burdensome in times of 
low profits. This reduces the risk of the underlying projects, since governments share the risk 
with the investor through the tax revenue mechanism. 
 
This may also help resolve the dynamic problems, sometimes referred to as time consistency 
problems, that are associated with natural resource tax design. Early in a project’s 
development, tax concessions are tempting to governments eager to attract investment in an 
environment where investment is risky and where there is asymmetric information between 
investors and governments. Yet if a project is successful and very large profits result, 
governments will be tempted to raise taxes ex post. Indeed, Sunley et al. (2003) note that 
fiscal regimes tend to evolve with underlying product prices, becoming less generous to 
companies as prices rise.  
 
Unfortunately, farsighted investors will anticipate this temptation and consider upcoming tax 
burdens to be part of the sovereign risk that deters the original investment. By committing to 
a progressive tax regime ahead of time, the government can both share in the investment 
risk and reduce the investor’s uncertainty about the evolution of future tax burdens.5 As 
Boadway and Keen (2010) note, both the government and the investor may be better off than 
if progressivity were not possible.  
 
Absent this consideration, progressive taxes are still desirable if governments are less risk-
averse than investors, as demonstrated in Boadway and Keen (2010). However, it is not 
clear theoretically which group should be more risk-averse, so this is an empirical matter that 
likely varies based on circumstance. 
 
1.2 Tax policy alternatives 
 
This section focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of several tax policy options for 
natural resource industries, discussing corporate income taxes, resource rent taxes, 
royalties, and other options. 
 
1.2.1 Corporate income taxes 
 
Corporate income taxes are a particularly important source of revenue in many less 
developed countries. Abbas and Klemm (2013) describe stylised facts regarding the role of 
corporate tax in developing countries in more detail, showing that corporate income taxes 
tend to make up a larger share of total tax revenue in developing countries than in developed 
countries. In part, this is due to the large amount of income earned outside the formal sector, 
as well as tax systems that are lacking in administrative capability. These features make 
revenue more dependent on sources that are easier to identify and tax, such as large 
businesses and imports. 
 
                                                 
4  Note that this meaning is not the meaning of progressive that is used in the larger tax policy literature, where a tax is 
considered to be progressive if the tax rate increases with the incomes of the taxpayers, the ultimate individuals or 
households that pay the tax. In the natural resources tax literature, progressivity depends on the tax payments of the 
firms in question, without any explicit assumptions regarding the underlying taxpayers. For example, if we assume that 
the corporate tax on firms earning rents is borne by the shareholders of the underlying firms, and that such shareholders 
hold diversified portfolios, it is not clear that a progressive profits tax would be more progressive (in the ordinary 
meaning of the word) than a ‘flat’ profits tax that collected the same revenue. 
5  Of course fiscal stability agreements can also be negotiated to limit the government’s ability to raise future taxes but 
such agreements are ad hoc and raise administrative costs, while reducing the government’s autonomy and tax 
revenue under favourable circumstances. 
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Profit taxes have some key advantages. They are sensitive to taxpayer ‘ability to pay’, since 
tax is only due when firms are profitable. To the extent that such taxes fall on excess profits, 
or rents, they avoid distortion. Effectively, the government becomes a silent partner in the 
project, especially if losses can be used to offset tax burdens, since corporate income tax will 
lower the variability of outcomes under different scenarios, reducing investment risk.  
 
But the same administrative capacity limits that make less developed countries dependent on 
corporate tax also make the tax base itself more vulnerable to erosion through tax 
avoidance. These problems are emphasised in Africa Progress Panel:  
 
Tax authorities in all regions struggle to prevent the erosion of their tax bases, but 
Africa struggles more than most. That is partly because of the restricted human, 
technical and financial resources available to revenue administrations. But it is also 
because companies involved in the extractive sector are highly integrated and make 
extensive use of offshore centres and tax havens with limited disclosure 
requirements. These are ideal conditions for tax evasion through mispricing. 
(Africa Progress Panel 2013: 79) 
 
As Laporte and Rota-Graziosi (2014: 7) summarise, taxing profits in extractive industries ‘is 
particularly exposed to the risk of profit shifting [through] thin capitalization, underestimation 
of turnover, transfer pricing, etc.’ 
 
1.2.2 Resource rent taxes 
 
As Land (2010) describes, resource rent taxes can be a useful way to make the tax base 
more sensitive to the underlying profitability of firms. The basic mechanism is to tax 
cumulatively over the life of a project, allowing recapture of costs as well as a required rate of 
return, and then taxing any profit beyond that. The key features of the tax include the rate of 
return that is allowed before the tax is triggered, the tax rate imposed on profits beyond that, 
and the tax base definition itself. Land (2010) discusses these parameters in more detail, and 
notes that such taxes can limit distortion, making for an efficient tax. Garnaut and Clunies 
Ross (1975) also discuss the general issues in designing such a tax. Baunsgaard (2001) 
describes how resource rent taxes could be designed equivalently with either a cumulative or 
a cash flow method. 
 
Indeed, some of the same features that make profit taxes desirable make resource rent taxes 
attractive, such as the risk-sharing features of the tax. However, there may be pragmatic 
drawbacks to such a tax, including the backloading of government revenue streams, the 
procyclical nature of revenue streams, and the administrative difficulty of implementing the 
tax. Further, the tax itself is not immune from the same income shifting and tax avoidance 
problems that plague corporate income tax.  
 
Sunley et al. emphasise these avoidance problems, and note that resource rent taxes are 
difficult to administer in practice, so they rarely raise much revenue: 
 
While the resource rent tax [RRT] has much theoretical appeal, it has not been a 
significant revenue raiser in practice. There may be many reasons for this. It could 
reflect the difficulty of designing the tax, particularly the choice of the discount (or 
hurdle) rate and tax rate. If the hurdle rate is set too high, chances are that the 
resource rent tax will never apply; if it is set too low, the tax may become a major 
deterrent to investment. If either the hurdle rate of return is too low or the tax rate too 
high, the RRT will also increase the incentives for oil companies to engage in tax 
avoidance, which in countries with a weak tax administration may be very difficult to 
detect and control. 
(Sunley et al. 2003: 6-7) 
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1.2.3 Royalties 
 
Royalties are a very common way to tax natural resource projects, and they have key 
administrative advantages relative to other taxes. The tax base is easier to observe, easing 
administration, and thus the levy is less subject to tax avoidance pressures. There is also 
more revenue stability and less volatility than arises with profits taxes. Royalties can be 
designed in a variety of ways, as detailed in Otto et al. (2006) and Sunley et al. (2003). 
Specific royalties are based on units of output, and ad valorem royalties are based on the 
value of output. Sunley et al. (2003) note that ad valorem royalties are used most often, and 
a wide range of royalty rates are observed in the oil and gas sector, ranging from 2 per cent 
to 30 per cent.  
 
Ad valorem royalties will be sensitive to the underlying product price of output in a way that 
gives the tax some of the same procyclical features of a profit tax. This could also generate 
some transfer pricing concerns, although regulations that specify an externally-observable 
price are helpful, as noted in Sunley et al. (2003). Further, transfer pricing distortions are 
much less problematic under royalties than under income taxes, since price manipulations 
have a much smaller effect on the tax base; this point is explained in more detail in the 
following section. 
 
There may be other downsides to royalties. Unlike profits or rents taxes, they are not 
sensitive to firms’ ability to pay, and thus they may discourage investment if projects are risky 
or yield low returns. Also, as noted in Boadway and Keen (2010), the time path of royalties 
will affect the time path of extraction. For example, an ad valorem royalty may accelerate 
extraction if the product price is expected to rise at a rate faster than the discount rate. 
Finally, royalties are typically not creditable in countries that use a foreign tax credit system 
of worldwide taxation, thus discouraging investment from such countries relative to similar 
tax burdens in the form of profit taxes.6  
 
Boadway and Keen (2010) note that there may be a role for royalties in combination with 
other taxes, in order to reach more efficient outcomes in the presence of asymmetric 
information between investors and the government.7  
 
1.2.4 Other tax regime options 
 
Another approach is to rely on production sharing agreements; this is particularly common in 
the petroleum sector, as noted in Baunsgaard (2001). Usually, this involves a long-term 
contractual agreement between a national oil company and a foreign investor. The investor 
bears the risk, and recovers costs and profit out of production, but the oil above what is 
needed to cover costs is then shared with the state. As Sunley et al. (2003) detail, there are 
a wide range of production sharing arrangements, with somewhere between a very small and 
a 90 per cent share accruing to the government; typically a dominant share goes to the 
government. In some cases, the share itself depends on underlying product prices or rates of 
return. As discussed in Baunsgaard (2001), production sharing agreements raise some of 
the same issues as profit taxes, including transfer pricing issues involving both product 
pricing and related-party costs.  
 
Baunsgaard (2001) also discusses how equity sharing may be unexpectedly difficult to 
administer, and can be a deterrent to investment. Auctions, while attractive in theory, also 
                                                 
6  This point is discussed in Siu et al. (2015: 12). Note that this issue is less important than in the past, as fewer countries 
use worldwide tax systems.  
7  Since the government does not have as much information as investors about the underlying profitability of potential 
projects, they can offer investors a choice of taxes from a menu of options. By allowing firms to choose their tax 
instrument based on their underlying type, the government may be able to earn more revenue than they would if they 
had to treat all investors symmetrically. This is shown in Box 7 of Boadway and Keen (2010), and the surrounding text. 
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pose difficulties due to both information problems and risk, as these issues make it difficult 
for the state to get a fair price at auction. In theory, many of these tax instruments and tax-
like arrangements can generate results that are equivalent to each other, as discussed in 
both Brosio (2006) and Baunsgaard (2001). Still, practical implementation issues differ 
substantially. 
 
1.3 A price-based royalty? 
 
The discussion so far has described why, in theory, the economic arguments for reliance on 
net income-based levies are persuasive, but, in practice, income-based levies pose difficult 
administrative problems. Taxes based on net income raise all the problems of base erosion 
and profit shifting that currently impede the effectiveness of corporate income taxes around 
the world; such problems are especially severe for developing country governments with 
limited administrative resources.8 The related revenue losses can have especially serious 
consequences in countries that rely on tax revenue from mineral extraction for substantial 
portions of their total national revenue. As noted by the OECD: 
 
Revenue loss from BEPS [base erosion and profit shifting] may be particularly 
important for resource rich developing countries. For these countries the taxation of 
natural resources is possibly the single biggest make or break fiscal concern in the 
next decade. MNEs [multinational enterprises] dominate the extractive industries, and 
commonly export materials to foreign related parties, making transfer pricing a critical 
issue in the industry. 
(OECD 2014: 11) 
 
Of course, royalties based on gross revenue pose administrative difficulties of their own, 
including most prominently the need to verify the market price of the product. This problem, 
however, involves less risk to the tax authority under a royalty based on gross revenue than 
under an income-based tax.9 Consider, for example, an extractive company that realises a 
net margin of 15 per cent of sales revenue. If the taxpayer receives total sales revenue of 
$1 million, its expenses will be $850,000, yielding net income of $150,000. Assume now 
that the taxpayer understates its net revenue by five per cent, or $50,000. The taxpayer’s 
net income will now be measured as $100,000 instead of $150,000; its income tax liability 
therefore will be understated by one-third (33.3 per cent). Under a royalty based on gross 
revenue, however, a 5 per cent understatement in gross income will lead only to a 5 per 
cent reduction in the amount of the royalty. The income-based measure is far more 
vulnerable, therefore, to transfer pricing non-compliance with respect to revenue than is the 
levy based on the taxpayer’s gross revenue. And, of course, overstatements by the 
taxpayer of interest costs, or the costs of services and equipment purchased from related 
parties, do not affect the government’s revenue under a royalty tax.10 
 
While royalties thus have key administrative advantages relative to income taxes, they are 
still subject to the aforementioned concerns about the insensitivity of tax burdens to the 
profitability of the underlying natural resource projects. Thus, a price-based royalty may have 
                                                 
8  The problems of base erosion and profit shifting, as they particular affect developing countries, are discussed in detail in 
the International Monetary Fund’s 2014 report, Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, and in a two-part 2014 
report of the OECD to the G20 Development Working Group on The Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries.  
9  A discussion of this topic, with an example similar in structure to that following in the text, is contained in Durst (2014). 
10  The much greater vulnerability of income- and rent-based taxes, than royalties, to transfer pricing manipulations may 
not have been fully appreciated in policymaking over the years. In practice, evaluations of alternative fiscal instruments 
note that both royalties and income- and rent-based taxes are vulnerable to the mispricing of extracted product; and this 
observation might produce the impression that both kinds of instruments are essentially equivalent in their vulnerability 
to price manipulation. In reality, however, as illustrated in the text, income- and rent-based levies are far more 
vulnerable to the manipulation of product pricing than are royalties – and income- and rent-based taxation are similarly 
highly vulnerable to the overstatement of interest expense, management fees and other related-party costs, whereas 
the effectiveness of royalties is not affected at all by manipulation of these quantities.  
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a useful role to play. A price-based royalty is based on gross revenue, but it also varies with 
changes in product prices in a way that is intended to approximate the performance of a net 
income tax. A price-based royalty has the potential to be of substantial benefit to 
governments of natural resource-producing countries, since it combines favourable features 
of both royalties and income taxes.  
 
In practice, some countries do attempt to implement royalties that vary with the profitability of 
the underlying projects, but experience in this area is quite limited. One example comes from 
the US state of Alaska. In 2006 and 2007, Alaska changed its oil and gas production tax in 
order to both raise more revenue for the state and to attract investment, as described in 
Dickinson and Wood (2009). The production tax was originally calculated as 15 per cent of 
gross value, multiplied by an ‘economic limit factor’ that averaged about 0.5, generating an 
effective tax rate closer to 8 per cent.  
 
The reform proposed replacing the tax with a 20 per cent tax that only applied to net income, 
after allowing deductions for exploration, development and production costs. A progressivity 
feature was added, adding a fraction of a percentage to the tax rate for every dollar the per 
barrel net price was above $30, subject to a maximum. This progressivity feature 
dramatically increased revenue relative to the pre-reform law, as shown in Dickinson and 
Wood (2009). Recent Alaskan revenue reports indicate that this tax raises substantial 
revenue. In a state with a population of about 700,000 people, corporate income tax raised 
about $300-$500 million over the period 2012-2014, whereas this production tax raised 
between $2 billion and $6 billion (Alaska Department of Revenue 2014).  
 
Boadway and Flatters (1993) note that some countries have historically used royalties that 
vary based on resource prices, including Peru and Malaysia (for oil), the state of Sabah in 
Malaysia (for timber), Indonesia (for coal) and Malaysia (for tin). However, there is little 
information on these particular taxes in the literature. Presently, Ernst and Young guides 
suggest that Peruvian oil royalties are based in part on scale, and in part on a measure of 
cumulative profitability.  
 
Indeed, much of the mention of such systems is rather dated. The Sabah timber royalty 
appears to have been successful in raising far more revenue from timber than other 
comparable regimes at the time; royalty rates were established based on type of log and 
average export prices. Sabah was estimated to collect between 42 per cent and 60 per cent 
of stumpage values between 1966 and 1985.  
 
A 1983 book entitled the World Tin Market notes that royalties charged on tin by several 
countries are based on prices, including Malaysia, Thailand, Bolivia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and 
most of Australia (Baldwin 1983).  
 
There are some examples of progressive profit taxes, or windfall taxes, that are based on 
underlying product prices, as noted in Land (2009, footnote 3). For example, China imposed 
a tax levy on oil companies in 2006 that was based on oil prices in excess of $40/barrel, and 
Algeria put a windfall tax on production values exceeding $30/barrel.  
 
It appears that the Chinese windfall tax is still in place at present, but it has been lessened 
due to recent declines in oil prices, according to Bloomberg (2014). The threshold that 
triggers the tax has been raised to $65/barrel. As noted in Reuters (2014), ‘A 20-percent tax 
will kick in at $65 a barrel, rising to 25 percent between $70 and $75, while the highest levy 
of 40 percent applies when crude prices are above $85.’ 
 
The Algerian law is also based on product prices, but it is contingent on the overall 
profitability of the firms in question. This is discussed in Layachi (2013). 
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Two relatively recent publications – Mintz and Chen (2012) and Conrad (2014) – catalogue 
fiscal regimes, including both royalty regimes and those based on measurement of income or 
rent, in a number of national and subnational jurisdictions, in countries at different levels of 
economic development. 
 
Despite the availability of these surveys of practices in different parts of the world, however, 
there appears to be no literature comparing the administrative success of different kinds of 
fiscal regimes in practice. For example, for both royalties and income- or rent-based 
instruments, it would be very useful to compare the actual yields of fiscal instruments, at 
actual production volumes and price levels, with projections that might have been made 
before the taxes were implemented. In addition, to evaluate the effectiveness of income- or 
rent-based taxes as applied to local mineral producers that are members of multinational 
groups, it would be useful to benchmark taxpayer ratios of both interest expense and 
management fees against normal business practice for independent producers, and also to 
determine whether the net operating margins reported by producers, for tax purposes, are 
consistent with what might be expected of independent producers that do not have 
opportunity for transfer pricing manipulation. Of course, concerns for the confidentiality of 
taxpayer information, as well as political reluctance to expose the effectiveness of tax 
administration to critical and quantitative evaluation, might make analyses of this kind 
infeasible. In the absence of quantitative evaluation, though, the possibility must be accepted 
that income- and rent-based fiscal regimes perform far less effectively than the literature 
sometimes appears to assume. 
 
Also, there is very little in the literature that describes and evaluates a price-based royalty 
system. While such a system would combine some of the favourable attributes of income 
and royalty taxes, there are still some downsides and unanswered questions to consider. 
One key question that will be explored below is how much of the variation in natural resource 
firm profits is explained by variation in product prices. The more closely profitability tracks 
product prices, the greater the advantages of a price-based royalty system.  
 
A factor that likely precludes a simple one-to-one correspondence between profits and 
product prices is cost escalation, as described in Land (2009: 164 and footnote 13): ‘In 
certain circumstances, cost escalation may significantly erode the advantage that high prices 
bring… Indeed, both the mining and petroleum sectors are affected by significant escalation 
of inputs into the industries, which has resulted in sharp rises in the capital costs of 
developing new mineral and hydrocarbon projects.’ 
 
It is also important to address some central design issues arising when royalty rates vary 
with product prices. To overcome time consistency problems and reduce investor 
uncertainty, it would be ideal to establish a formula that would not need to be changed often. 
It would also be ideal to have a uniform formula that applied to all firms in a given sector, 
rather than one that was negotiated on an ad hoc basis, since this would reduce the political 
pressure to negotiate special deals.  
 
 
2  Data analysis 
 
This section considers the relationship between firm profitability and product prices for firms 
in the extractive industry. 
 
Data is gathered from several sources. For firm data, we rely on Forbes lists of the world’s 
largest 2,000 firms; these lists are published annually and include information on firms’ rank 
(of the 2,000 largest firms), their market valuation, and information on sales, profits, and 
assets. Of chief interest here is the profitability of each firm, though profits are likely 
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dependent on other aspects of particular firms. Indeed, firm level assets are also used as a 
control variable in the following analysis.11  
 
The following analysis studies the period 2003-2014. Data on commodity prices is taken from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) commodity price database.12 They provide data on 
fuel price indexes, metals price indexes, particular oil price series and location-specific 
natural gas price series, and some particular metal price series. Some data on particular 
metal prices is also sourced from the World Bank’s Global Economic Monitor (GEM) 
commodities data.13 The World Bank also provides data on variables that are used as 
controls, such as world GDP growth. 
 
Figures 1 through 4 show that profits of firms in the extractive industry map their product 
prices fairly closely, on aggregate. Consider Figure 1, which shows the average profits of 
firms in the oil and gas sector against the IMF Fuel Price Index. It is clear that profits rose 
steadily as fuel prices increased from 2003 to 2008, then both profits and prices fell sharply 
before increasing again until 2011 and then declining until the end of the period. Firms are 
only included in Figure 1 if they have data for all twelve years of the sample.  
 
Figure 1 Average profits of oil and gas firms (in million USD) and Fuel Price Index 
 
 
  
                                                 
11  The Forbes method is described in more detail here: <http://www.forbes.com/2011/04/20/global-2000-11-
methodology.html> (accessed 24 July 2015). They note that: ‘All figures are consolidated and in U.S. dollars. For 
companies in the U.S., Canada and off-shore (such as Bermuda) we use the latest-12-months’ financial data (sales, 
profits and assets). For international companies we use the latest-fiscal-year financial data. We rely heavily on the 
databases for all data, as well as the latest financial period available for our rankings (the final database screen was run 
in mid-April). Many factors play into which financial period of data is available for the companies and used in our 
rankings: the timeliness of our data collection/screening and company reporting policies, country-specific reporting 
policies and the lag time between when a company releases its financial data and when the databases capture it for 
screening/ranking. We quality-check the downloaded financial data to the best of our ability using other data sources, 
including Bloomberg and available company financial statements.’ 
12  Data is available here: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.aspx>.  
13  Data is available here: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx>.  
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Figure 2 indicates that profits of mining firms also track the Metals Price Index, in terms of 
the general qualitative trends. Here, firms are included if they have ten years of data. 
 
Figure 2 Average profits of mining firms (in million USD) and Metals Price Index 
 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show only firms mining gold and copper, the two most important metals in 
the dataset. In these figures, only firms with ten years or more of data are included, and firms 
are included if more than ten per cent of their revenue comes from gold or copper. A visual 
inspection shows that the profits of copper mining firms appear to track copper prices more 
closely than the profits of gold mining firms track gold prices.  
 
Figure 3 Average profits of gold mining firms (in million USD) and Gold Price Index 
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Figure 4 Average profits of copper firms (in million USD) and Copper Price Index 
 
 
Of course, these simple figures do not control for other variables that affect firm profitability, 
nor do they indicate how closely firm profitability is related to product prices. However, 
regression analysis can address these considerations. Table 1 analyses the profits of oil and 
gas firms in the Forbes 2000 over the period 2003-2014. It is an unbalanced panel; firms are 
included even if data is not available for each year. There are 911 observations over twelve 
years; the typical firm has eight years of data.14  
 
Table 1 Regressions explaining profits for oil/gas firms in Global 2000 
(Dependent variable: natural log transformation of profits, reported in million USD) 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
ln (assets) 1.038* 0.861* 
 (0.0207) 
 
(0.0795) 
ln (fuel price index) 0.686* 0.760* 
 (0.139) 
 
(0.107) 
time trend -0.136* -0.135* 
 (0.0159) 
 
(0.0136) 
world GDP growth 0.0248 0.0315* 
 (0.0165) 
 
 
(0.0125) 
N 911 911 
Fixed Firm Effects? No Yes 
 
R2 0.74 0.74 
R2 Within  0.24 
R2 Between  0.80 
Standard errors in parentheses. Includes only firms with positive profits. 
* p < 0.05 
 
 
                                                 
14  We also restricted each regression to balanced panels, allowing in the dataset only those firms that had observations in 
every year. This reduces the observations to about 55% of the total. However, the general nature of the results is 
unchanged; there is an increase in R2 but point estimates of the main coefficients are similar.  
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Firm profits are modelled as being a function of firm assets, product prices, a time trend, and 
world GDP growth.15 In column (1), a pooled specification is run, including all firm 
observations. Data on prices, assets and profits are transformed using natural logs, so 
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.16 In column (1), a 1 per cent increase in assets 
is associated with an approximately 1 per cent increase in profits. A 1 per cent increase in 
the Fuel Price Index is associated with about a 0.7 per cent increase in profits.17 Over time, 
profits show a downward trend, controlling for other variables. World GDP growth is 
positively associated with firm profitability, but only with 85 per cent confidence, thus not 
meeting the typical 95 per cent threshold for statistical significance. The model performs well, 
explaining 74 per cent of the variation in firm profitability.  
 
However, most of the explanatory power of the model comes from the asset variable. In all of 
the pooled regressions reported in this paper, a formal decomposition of the contribution to 
R2 of each variable indicates the price variable accounts for less than 20 per cent of the 
equation’s explanatory power.18 
 
In column (2), a fixed effects specification is considered. This allows a separate intercept 
term for each firm in the analysis, and thus accounts for particular features of firms that might 
affect their underlying profitability. For example, one might think that the ‘base’ level of profits 
for Royal Dutch Shell would be different from that of Chevron, and this specification would 
model that difference explicitly. Indeed, statistical tests indicate that a fixed effects 
specification is warranted here.  
 
Results from column (2) are largely similar to those of column (1), with a slightly higher 
estimate for the price elasticity (.76 instead of .69) and a slightly lower estimate of the asset 
elasticity (.86 instead of 1.04). The world GDP term is now statistically significant. Still, note 
that most coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from their values in column (1).  
 
Table 2 considers similar regression equations for firms in the mining industry. In this 
dataset, there are 439 observations from mining firms over the period 2003-2014. Again, we 
consider all observations, even if a firm does not stay in the sample for the whole period; the 
average firm has six years of data.19 One issue associated with mining firms is that they each 
extract different metals, and of course metals prices do not move uniformly. In Table 2, all 
mining firms are included, and their profits are modelled as depending on the IMF Metals 
Price Index; subsequent tables will consider gold and copper firms separately. 
 
  
                                                 
15  We also tried all regressions excluding the asset variable. This did not change any of the price results substantially, 
although it did lower the explanatory power of the models. 
16  This also restricts analysis to profitable firms. If analysis is extended to firms incurring losses, the model performs less 
well overall, but most of the inferences regarding individual variables are unchanged. 
17  We also considered specifications that considered oil prices instead of fuel prices, without changing the coefficient on 
the price variable in a statistically significant way.  
18  Analysis is based on Shapley/Owen decompositions. Price terms do a bit better in regressions explaining the ratio of 
profits/assets. In this case, in some instances, price variables account for a bit over 25% of the R2; however, the R2 are 
also lower. Price variables also explain more of the total variation if analysis is not restricted to profitable firms; still, the 
model as a whole has less explanatory power in that case. 
19  As with oil/gas firms, the main results are not sensitive to this decision. If firms are only included if they have more than 
ten years of data, coefficient results are quite similar, although there are fewer observations and the R2 increases. 
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Table 2 Regressions explaining profits for mining firms in Global 2000 
(Dependent variable: natural log transformation of profits, reported in million USD) 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
ln (assets) 0.735* 0.527* 
 (0.0368) (0.0864) 
   
ln (metals price index) 1.119* 1.382* 
 (0.188) (0.140) 
   
time trend -0.101* -0.0912* 
 (0.0211) (0.0203) 
   
world GDP growth -0.00455 -0.0288 
 (0.0238) (0.0173) 
   
N 439 439 
Fixed Firm Effects? No Yes 
 
R2 0.51 0.48 
R2 Within  0.44 
R2 Between  0.33 
Standard errors in parentheses. Includes only firms with positive profits. 
* p < 0.05 
 
Table 2 results are broadly similar to those of Table 1. Column (1) shows results for the 
pooled specification. Firm assets show an elasticity of 0.74; a 1 per cent increase in assets is 
associated with a 0.74 per cent increase in profits. Profits are more sensitive to product 
prices than in the prior table; an increase in the Metals Price Index of 1 per cent is associated 
with an increase in profits of 1.12 per cent. Again, profits show a negative time trend. In this 
table, world GDP growth is no longer statistically significantly related to firm profits. 
 
Column (2) reports a firm fixed effects specification. This may be particularly necessary in the 
case of mining firms, since they specialise in different metals, and statistical tests indicate 
that a fixed effects specification is justified. As in Table 1, this increases the point estimate of 
the price elasticity and decreases the point estimate of the asset elasticity. Now a 1 per cent 
increase in metals prices is associated with a 1.38 per cent increase in firm profitability, 
accounting for separate intercept terms for each firm. 
 
Table 3 reports results for subsets of the data: columns (1) and (2) show results for firms that 
earn more than 10 per cent of their revenue from gold, and columns (3) and (4) show results 
for firms that earn more than 10 per cent of their revenue from copper.20 Columns (1) and (3) 
show pooled specifications, and Columns (2) and (4) include firm fixed effects. There are 
fewer observations, but the main results are similar in character. Assets are positively 
associated with profits in all specifications, with elasticities ranging from 0.46 to 0.73.  
 
Product prices are positively related to firm profits in all cases, and statistically significant in 
three of four specifications, though the coefficient in column (1) is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. When statistically significant, price elasticities range from 1.22 to 
1.89. 
  
 
  
                                                 
20  It would be ideal to include more subsets of the data for different metals, but the other metals have insufficient firm 
observations for this type of analysis.  
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Table 3 Regressions explaining profits for gold and copper firms in Global 2000 
(Dependent variable: natural log transformation of profits, reported in million USD) 
 
 (1) 
Gold 
(2) 
Gold 
(3) 
Copper 
(4) 
Copper 
     
ln (assets) 0.461* 0.673* 0.726* 0.533* 
 (0.0708) (0.139) (0.0642) (0.120) 
 
ln (gold price)  0.461 
(0.524) 
1.883* 
(0.485) 
 
  
ln (copper price)    1.222* 
(0.257) 
1.568* 
(0.199) 
 
time trend 0.0153 -0.228* -0.151* -0.140* 
 (0.0891) (0.0822) (0.0325) (0.0296) 
 
world GDP growth 0.0894* 0.0696* 0.0213 -0.0319 
 (0.0340) (0.0274) (0.0381) (0.0284) 
 
N 136 136 169 169 
Firm fixed effects? 
 
No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.37 0.34 0.49 0.45 
R2 Within  0.57  0.49 
R2 Between  0.02  0.52 
Standard errors in parentheses. Firms are included if greater than 10% of their revenues result from gold or copper.  
* p < 0.05 
 
 
3  Conclusion 
 
For practical tax policy design, a price-based royalty has appealing features. It is more 
sensitive to the underlying profitability of the firm than a simple royalty, and this helps the tax 
mimic an income- or rent-based tax, while avoiding some of the disadvantages of an income- 
or rent-based tax. 
 
Income and resource rent taxes are attractive in that they enable risk sharing between the 
government and the investor, allowing a balance of the competing goals of revenue 
collection and investor incentives. In theory, since taxes are only triggered when firms are 
profitable, taxation need not deter less profitable investments, yet excess profits can be 
taxed, allowing access to important revenue for the state. In practice, however, income and 
excess profit taxes are vulnerable to transfer price manipulations by taxpayers, making these 
taxes difficult to administer due to tax avoidance and the complexity associated with 
collecting the tax.  
 
Royalties, on the other hand, are far simpler to administer. As long as they are based on an 
externally observable price for the underlying product, it is much easier for a tax authority to 
collect royalties. Compared with an income tax, royalties are much harder to avoid through 
transfer price manipulation and other income shifting techniques. However, since royalties 
are not as sensitive to the profitability of the underlying projects, they may deter investment.  
 
A price-based royalty has the potential to combine the favourable features of both an 
income- or rent-based tax and a royalty. However, it still raises important design issues. One 
essential issue is the extent to which firm profitability tracks product prices. The present 
investigation is a step towards understanding this relationship. Simple graphical relationships 
between product prices and firm profitability indicate that, for both oil/gas firms and mining 
firms, underlying average firm profitability tends to move in the same direction, and at the 
same times, as product prices.  
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A regression analysis confirms this relationship. For both oil/gas firms and mining firms, there 
is a nearly one-to-one relationship between product prices and firm profitability; prices 1 per 
cent higher tend to be associated with profits about 0.76 per cent higher for oil/gas firms, and 
about 1.38 per cent higher for mining firms.21  
 
However, it is important to also note that many factors affect firm profitability. Of the 
explanatory variables in the regression, the assets of the firm are the largest contribution to 
the explanatory power of the models examined here. Product prices alone do not account for 
an important share of the underlying profit variation across firms. In part, this may be the 
result of the diverse set of firms included in the Forbes Global 2000. One might expect that 
the underlying profitability of the world’s largest oil/gas and mining firms would depend on 
many factors, including the scale of the firm itself. 
 
In sum, tax administrators should give serious consideration to increasing the use of price-
based royalties as substitutes for income or rent taxes. The limited experience in Alaska and 
elsewhere suggests that such taxes can be successful. As is true of all taxes, careful 
attention should be paid to design and implementation of price-based royalties, and their 
performance after implementation should be monitored closely.  
 
Finally, this paper suggests important avenues for future research regarding design and 
implementation issues surrounding price-based royalties. In addition, empirical research is 
needed to evaluate the administrative performance of current tax systems, including income- 
and rent-based natural resource levies in both developing and developed countries.  
 
 
  
                                                 
21  These are the results from the column (2) specifications of Tables 1 and 2; these are the preferred specifications. 
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